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LIMITS TO JOINING WITH GENERICS AND RANDOMS
ADAM R. DAY AND DAMIR D. DZHAFAROV
Abstract. Posner and Robinson [4] proved that if S ⊆ ω is non-computable,
then there exists a G ⊆ ω such that S ⊕ G ≥T G
′. Shore and Slaman [7]
extended this result to all n ∈ ω, by showing that if S T ∅(n−1) then there
exists a G such that S ⊕ G ≥T G
(n). Their argument employs Kumabe-
Slaman forcing, and so the set they obtain, unlike that of the Posner-Robinson
theorem, is not generic for Cohen forcing in any way. We answer the question
of whether this is a necessary complication by showing that for all n ≥ 1, the
set G of the Shore-Slaman theorem cannot be chosen to be even weakly 2-
generic. Our result applies to several other effective forcing notions commonly
used in computability theory, and we also prove that the set G cannot be
chosen to be 2-random.
1. Introduction
Our starting point is the following well-known theorem of computability theory.
Theorem 1.1 (Posner and Robinson [4], Theorem 1). For all S ⊆ ω, if S is non-
computable there exists G ⊆ ω such that S ⊕G,S ⊕ ∅′ ≥T G′. (In particular, when
S ≤T ∅′ then S ⊕G ≡T G′ ≡T ∅′.)
In order to generalize the Posner-Robinson theorem to higher numbers of jumps,
we need an additional condition on S. If we want S ⊕G ≥T G(n), then we need S
to be not computable in ∅(n−1), since otherwise S ⊕G ≤T ∅(n−1) ⊕G ≤T G(n−1).
In connection with their work on the definability of the jump, Shore and Slaman
proved this is the only condition needed for the generalization.
Theorem 1.2 (Shore and Slaman [7], Theorem 2.1). For all n ≥ 1 and all S ⊆ ω,
if S T ∅(n−1) there exists G ⊆ ω such that S ⊕G,S ⊕ ∅(n) ≥T G(n).
The proof of Shore-Slaman theorem is not a simple generalization of Posner and
Robinson’s proof. While both theorems are proved using forcing constructions,
they differ in the underlying forcing notion used. Posner and Robinson use Cohen
forcing, and show that the set G in Theorem 1.1 can actually be chosen to be Cohen
1-generic. Shore and Slaman use a considerably more intricate notion of forcing, due
to Kumabe and Slaman (discussed further in Section 3). This raises the question of
whether Theorem 1.2 can be proved using Cohen forcing. More generally, one can
ask whether Theorem 1.2 can be proved using some other commonly used forcing
notion, such as Jockusch-Soare forcing or Mathias forcing.
In this article, we give a negative answer to the above questions. We prove a
general result that applies to most of the forcing notions P used in computability
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Fellowship in the Department of Mathematics at the University of California, Berkeley. The
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theory, and which roughly states that if n is sufficiently large and G ⊆ ω is suf-
ficiently generic for P, then G does not satisfy Theorem 1.2. For Cohen forcing,
n = 1 and weak 2-genericity suffice. We then prove a similar result for random-
ness, showing that for each n ≥ 2, the set G in Theorem 1.2 cannot be chosen to
be n-random. The conclusion is that the complexity inherent in Kumabe-Slaman
forcing is in fact essential to proof of Theorem 1.2.
We refer the reader to Soare [8] and Downey and Hirschfeldt [3] for background
on computability theory and algorithmic randomness, respectively. A brief account
of forcing in arithmetic, as we shall use it, is included in Section 3 below.
2. A non-joining theorem for generics
The purpose of this section is to prove the following theorem. We shall prove
in the next section a theorem applying to forcing notions in general, of which this
will be the special case for Cohen forcing. We present this argument separately in
order to make the basic idea easier to understand.
Theorem 2.1. There exists a ∅′-computable perfect tree T ⊆ 2<ω such that for all
S ∈ [T ] and all G ⊆ ω, if G is weakly 2-generic then S ⊕G T ∅′.
The theorem establishes that for all n ≥ 2, the set G in Theorem 1.2 cannot be
chosen to be n-generic.
Corollary 2.2. For all n ≥ 2, there exists an S T ∅(n−1) such that for all G ⊆ ω,
if G is weakly 2-generic then S ⊕G T ∅′. In particular, S ⊕G T G(n).
Proof. Let T ⊆ 2<ω be the tree obtained from Theorem 2.1. As T is perfect, we
may choose an S ∈ [T ] such that S T ∅(n−1). Then for every weakly 2-generic
set G, and so certainly for every n-generic G, we have S ⊕G T ∅′. In particular,
S ⊕G T G(n). 
We proceed with the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Computably in ∅′, we construct the tree T , an auxiliary set
B ⊆ ω, and a sequence {De}e∈ω of dense subsets of 2<ω. Our objective is to meet
the following requirements for all e ∈ ω.
Re : If S ∈ [T ] and G ⊆ ω meets De, then Φe(S ⊕G) 6= B.
Of course, every weakly 2-generic set meets each set De. And as B will be ∅′-
computable, meeting these requirements suffices.
Construction. We obtain T , B, and each De as
⋃
s Ts,
⋃
sBs, and
⋃
sDe,s, where
Ts, Bs, and De,s denote the portions of each of these sets built by the beginning of
stage s. Initially, let T0 = {λ}, where λ is the empty string, and let B0 = De,0 = ∅
for all e.
At stage s = 〈e, t〉, assume Ts, Bs, and De,s have been defined. Let 〈σi : i < n〉
enumerate all strings of the form τb, where τ is a maximal string in Ts and b ∈ {0, 1}.
This step adds a split above each element of Ts. Let 〈τj : j < m〉 enumerate all
binary strings smaller than s. For all j < m, we will enumerate an extension τ∗j of
τj into De, thus ensuring that De is dense.
For all i < n and j < m, we will choose a unique number xi,j > s not in Bs, and
define sequences
σi  σi,0  · · ·  σi,m−1
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and
τj  τj,0  · · ·  τj,n−1
with |σi,j | = |τj,i|, such that one of the following applies:
(1) there is a b ∈ {0, 1} such that Φ
σi,j⊕τj,i
e (xi,j) ↓= b;
(2) Φσ⊕τe (xi,j) ↑ for all σ  σi,j and τ  τj,i with |σ| = |τ |.
We define σi,j and τj,i simultaneously. For convenience, let σi,−1 = σi and
τj,−1 = τj . Let (i, j) be the lexicographically least pair in ω × ω such that σi,j and
τj,i are not defined (this implies that σi,j−1 and τj,i−1 are already defined). Using
∅′, we can find a σ  σi,j−1 and a τ  τj,i−1 that satisfy 1 or 2 above, and we let
σi,j and τj,i be the least such σ and τ , respectively.
To complete the construction, add xi,j to Bs+1 for all i, j such that case 1 above
applies with b = 0. Then, for all j < m, let τ∗j be the least extension of τj,n−1
greater than s, and add τ∗j to De,s+1. Finally, for all i < n, let σ
∗
i be an extension
of σi,m−1 of length |τ∗j |, and add all initial segments of σ
∗
i to Ts+1.
Verification. The construction is ∅′-computable, and so, since at each stage s, only
elements greater than s are added to B and De, it follows that B and the sequence
{De}e∈ω are computable in A. It is clear that the De are dense: given any τ ∈ 2
<ω,
an extension of τ is added to De at each sufficiently large stage s = 〈e, t〉.
Now fix e, let G be any weakly 2-generic set, and let S be any element of [T ].
Then we may choose a τ ≺ G in De. Let s be the least stage such that τ ∈ De,s, and
let σ be a maximal initial segment of S in Ts, so that |σ| = |τ |. By construction,
there is an x such that one of the following cases applies:
(1) Φσ⊕τe (x) ↓= 1−B(x);
(2) Φσ
∗⊕τ∗
e (x) ↑ for all σ
∗  σ and τ∗  τ .
Now if case 1 holds, then ΦS⊕Ge (x) ↓= 1 − B(x) since σ  S and τ  G. And if
case 2 holds, then it cannot be that ΦS⊕Ge (x) converges, else some initial segments
of S and G would witness a contradiction.
We conclude that Φe(S ⊕ G) 6= B, and hence that requirement Re is satisfied.
This completes the verification and the proof. 
The proof given establishes that S⊕G 6≥T ∅′ by constructing an auxiliary set B
below ∅′ and showing that S⊕G 6≥T B. In fact this proof can be easily modified to
show that for any non-computable set A ≤T ∅
′, there is a perfect tree T computable
in ∅′ such that for all S ∈ [T ] and all G ⊆ ω, if G is weakly 2-generic then
S ⊕G 6≥T A. However, this argument does not generalize directly to other forcing
notions.
3. Extensions to other forcing notions
We now extend Theorem 2.1 to other forcing notions. We assume familiarity with
the basics of forcing in arithmetic, but as these formulations are often dependent on
the nuances of the definitions, we include a brief review of some of the particulars
of our treatment. Our approach is close to that of Shore [6, Chapter 3], with some
variations. The goal is to define forcing in a way that is general enough to cover
the forcing notions most commonly used in computability theory.
Definition 3.1. A notion of forcing is a triple P = (P,≤, V ), where:
(1) P is an infinite subset of ω;
(2) ≤ is a partial ordering of P ;
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(3) V is a monotone map from (P,≤) to (2<ω,) such that for each n ∈ ω, the
set of p ∈ P with |V (p)| ≥ n is dense.
As is customary, we refer to the elements of P as the conditions of P, and say
q ∈ P extends p ∈ P if q ≤ p. We call the map V a valuation. For each F ⊆ P , we
let |V (F )| denote supp∈F |V (p)|.
Definition 3.2. Let P = (P,≤, V ) be a forcing notion, and F a filter on (P,≤). If
C is a set of subsets of P , then F is C-generic for P if
(1) |V (F )| =∞;
(2) for every C ∈ C, either F ∩C 6= ∅ or F ∩ {p ∈ P : (∀q ≤ p)[q /∈ C]} 6= ∅.
Condition 1 above ensures that if F is any generic filter then V (F ) uniquely deter-
mines a subset of ω. If F is C-generic for P and G = V (F ), then we also say that
G is C-generic for P.
The following definition is standard in effective applications of forcing.
Definition 3.3. Let A ⊆ ω be given, and let P = (P,≤, V ) be a notion of forcing.
(1) P is A-computable if P , ≤, and V are A-computable.
(2) A set D ⊆ P is A-effectively dense if there is an A-computable function
that takes each p ∈ P to some q ≤ p in D.
We work in the usual forcing language, consisting of the language of second-order
arithmetic, augmented by a new set constant G˙ intended to denote the generic real.
The (strong) forcing relation P is defined recursively in the standard way, starting
by putting p P ϕ for p ∈ P if ϕ is a true atomic sentence of first-order arithmetic,
or if ϕ is n˙ ∈ G˙ (respectively, n˙ 6∈ G˙) for some n < |V (p)| such that V (p)(n) = 1
(respectively, V (p)(n) = 0). For conjunctions we write p P ϕ ∧ ψ if p P ϕ and
p P ψ. For existential formulas we write p P ∃xϕ(x) if p P ϕ(n˙) for some n ∈ ω.
Finally for negations we write p P ¬ϕ if for all q ≤ p it is not true that q P ϕ.
It is easy to see that if G = V (F ) for some filter F on (P,≤) with |V (F )| =∞,
and if p  ϕ(G˙) for some p ∈ F and some Σ01 sentence ϕ of the forcing language,
then ϕ(G) holds. (Of course, this is just a consequence of the more powerful fact
that forcing implies truth for any sufficiently generic real, but we shall not need
that here.)
We introduce the following concept.
Definition 3.4. Let A ⊆ ω be given, let P = (P,≤, V ) be a notion of forcing,
and let {ϕi}i∈ω be an enumeration of all Σ01 formulas in the forcing language. We
say that P is 1-decidable in A if P is A-computable, and there is an A-computable
function f : P × ω → P × {0, 1} such that if (q, t) = f(p, i) then
(1) q ≤ p;
(2) if t = 1 then q P ϕi;
(3) if t = 0 and q P ¬ϕi.
Note that if A ≥T ∅′, then being 1-decidable in A reduces to the set of conditions in
P that decide ϕi being A-effectively dense, uniformly in i. This is because p forcing
a Σ01 fact corresponds a Σ
0
1 fact holding of V (p), and V (p) is computable in A.
Let C denote Cohen forcing. The product notion C× P is the notion of forcing
whose elements are pairs (σ, p) ∈ 2<ω × P such that |σ| = |V (p)|, with extension
defined componentwise. The induced valuation, V×, on the product, is defined by
V×(σ, p) = σ ⊕ V (p).
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Cohen forcing is easily seen to be 1-decidable in ∅′. We wish also to calibrate the
level of 1-decidability for some other common notions of forcing, to which to apply
Theorem 3.7 below. These include the following:
• Jockusch-Soare forcing inside a non-empty Π01 class with no computable
member;
• Sacks forcing with perfect binary trees;
• Mathias forcing with conditions restricted to pairs (D,E) such that E is
an infinite computable set.
For each of these notions the set of conditions can be coded as a subset of ω, and
there is a natural valuation map fitting Definition 3.1 above. (We refer the reader to
[3, Section 8.18], [1, Definition 2.1], and [6, Example 3.14], respectively, for explicit
definitions.)
In addition, we wish to consider Kumabe-Slaman forcing, which is especially
important in the present discussion because of its use in proving Theorem 1.2. As
this forcing may be less familiar, we include its definition. (See [7, Definition 2.5],
for complete details.) A Turing functional Φ, regarded as a set of triples 〈σ, x, y〉
representing that Φσ(x) ↓= y, is called use-monotone if the following hold:
(1) if 〈σ, x, y〉 and 〈σ′, x′, y′〉 belong to Φ and σ′ ≺ σ then x′ < x;
(2) if 〈σ, x, y〉 ∈ Φ and x′ < x, then 〈σ′, x′, y′〉 ∈ Φ for some y′ and σ′  σ.
Definition 3.5. Let (P,≤) be the following partial order.
(1) The elements of P are pairs (Φ, ~X), such that Φ is a finite {0, 1}-valued
use-monotone Turing functional, and ~X is a finite set of subsets of ω.
(2) (Ψ, ~Y ) ≤ (Φ, ~X) in P if:
(a) Φ ⊆ Ψ, and if 〈σ, x, y〉 ∈ Ψ− Φ and 〈σ′, x′, y′〉 ∈ Φ then |σ| > |σ′|;
(b) ~X ⊆ ~Y , and if σ is an initial segment of some X ∈ ~X and 〈σ, x, y〉 ∈ Ψ
then 〈σ, x, y〉 ∈ Φ.
Kumabe-Slaman forcing is the notion (P,≤, V ) with P and ≤ as above, and V :
P → 2<ω defined by V ((Φ, ~X)) = Φ. Of course, P here cannot be coded as a
subset of ω. However, our interest will be in a restriction of this forcing that can
be so coded, namely, when the conditions are pairs (Φ, ~X) such that ~X consists of
∅(n)-computable sets.
We have the following bounds on the complexity of each of these notions.
Proposition 3.6.
(1) Cohen forcing is 1-decidable in ∅′.
(2) Jockusch-Soare forcing inside a non-empty Π01 class with no computable
member is 1-decidable in ∅′.
(3) Sacks forcing with perfect trees is 1-decidable in ∅′′.
(4) Mathias forcing with computable sets is 1-decidable in ∅′′.
(5) Kumabe-Slaman forcing with ∅(n)-computable sets is 1-decidable in ∅(n+2).
Proof. Part 1 is clear. Part 2 is essentially by the proof of the low basis theorem,
as forcing the jump involves asking whether a particular Π01 subclass is non-empty.
Part 3 is similar, but we gain an extra quantifier as the set of conditions is only
computable in ∅′′. Part 4 follows by Lemma 4.3 of [1], and 5 is implicit in Lemmas
2.10 and 2.11 of [7]. 
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Note that for any of the notions P in the previous proposition, the same bounds
on 1-decidability apply also to C× P.
We can now state and prove our extension of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.7. Let A ⊆ ω be given, and let P = (P,≤, V ) be a notion of forcing
such that C × P is 1-decidable in A. There exists an A-computable perfect tree
T ⊆ 2<ω, and an A-computable class C of dense subsets of P , such that for all
S ∈ [T ] and all G ⊆ ω, if G is C-generic then S ⊕G T A.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.1, so we just highlight the differ-
ences. The construction is now computable in A, the sets De are subsets of P , and
we let C = {De}e∈ω. The requirements take the following form.
Re : If S ∈ [T ] and F is a filter on (P,≤) with |V (F )| =∞ that meets De,
then Φe(S ⊕ V (F )) 6= B.
The construction is modified in that at stage s = 〈e, t〉 we fix an enumeration
〈pj : j < m〉 of all conditions smaller than s, and instead of building two sequences
of strings, σi  σi,0  · · ·  σi,m−1 and τj  τj,0  · · ·  τj,n−1, the latter is
replaced by a sequence pj ≥ pj,0 ≥ · · · ≥ pj,n−1 of conditions. For all i, j, we ensure
that |σi,j | = |V (pj,i)| and that one of the following applies:
(1) (σi,j , pi,j) C×P Φe(G˙)(xi,j) ↓= 1;
(2) (σi,j , pi,j) C×P ¬(Φe(G˙)(xi,j) ↓= 1).
This can be done A-computably, using the fact that C × P is 1-decidable in A to
decide the Σ01 sentence Φe(G˙)(xi,j) ↓= 1. The definitions of Ts+1, and De,s+1, are
then entirely analogous to their definitions in the proof of Theorem 2.1, and Bs+1
is obtained from Bs by adding xi,j for all i, j for which case 2 applies.
For the verification, fix e, let G ⊆ ω be C-generic, and let S be any element of
[T ]. Let F be a filter on (P,≤) such that G = V (F ), so that |V (F )| = ∞ and F
meets De. Choose p ∈ F ∩De, let s be the least stage such that p ∈ De,s, and let
σ be a maximal initial segment of S in Ts, so that |σ| = |V (p)|. By construction,
there is an x such that one of the following cases applies:
(1) B(x) = 0 and (σ, p) C×P Φe(G˙)(x) ↓= 1;
(2) B(x) = 1 and (σ, p) C×P ¬(Φe(G˙)(x) ↓= 1).
If case 1 holds, then by the general definition of forcing, Φe(V×(σ, p))(x) ↓= 1, and
hence Φe(σ⊕ V (p))(x) ↓= 1 6= B(x). It follows that Φe(S ⊕ V (F ))(x) ↓= 1−B(x)
since σ ≺ S and V (p) ≺ V (F ). Now suppose case 2 holds. If Φe(S⊕V (F ))(x) ↓= 1
then there exists some n ≥ |σ| = |V (p)| such that Φe(S ↾ n ⊕ V (F ) ↾ n)(x) ↓= 1.
As |V (F )| = ∞, F necessarily contains some q ∈ P with |V (q)| ≥ n, and as F is
a filter, we may assume q ≤ p. Let τ be any initial segment of S of length |V (q)|.
Then (τ, q) is an extension of (σ, p) in C × P that forces Φe(G˙)(x) ↓= 1, which is
impossible. Hence, it must be that Φe(S⊕V (F ))(x) ↑ or Φe(S⊕V (F ))(x) ↓= 0. 
Now suppose P is one of the notions of forcing listed above. We obtain the
following consequences.
Corollary 3.8. Let P = (P,≤, V ) be any of the notions of forcing discussed above,
and let A ⊆ ω be such that P is 1-decidable in A, as calibrated in Proposition 3.6.
(Hence C×P is 1-decidable in A, as remarked above.) There exists an A-computable
class C of dense subsets of P , and for each non-computable set B ⊆ ω an S T B,
such that for all G ⊆ ω, if G is C-generic for P then S ⊕G T A.
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Proof. The proof is similar to that of Corollary 2.2, which is just the special case
when P = C, A = ∅′, and B = ∅(n−1). Theorem 3.7 produces the class C, as well as
a perfect tree T through which we choose an infinite path S T B. By construction,
S ⊕G T A for all C-generic G. 
We conclude this section by noting an interesting consequence of the corollary
to Kumabe-Slaman forcing. As noted above, general Kumabe-Slaman forcing, i.e.,
forcing with pairs (Φ, ~X), where ~X ranges over arbitrary finite collections of sets,
cannot be readily coded as a subset of ω. One could nonetheless ask whether
some such coding is possible, and in particular, whether the notion can be made
1-decidable in some arithmetical set A. The corollary implies that this cannot be
so. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 1.2 in [7] for n only uses Kumabe-Slaman with
∅(n)-computable sets, and produces a set G = V (F ) for a filter F that decides every
Σ0n sentence. It is not difficult to see that if n ≥ m+1 then any such G is generic for
every ∅(m)-computable class of subsets of conditions. So, if Kumabe-Slaman forcing
were 1-decidable in ∅(m), we could apply the corollary to find an S T ∅(n−1) such
that for all G as above, S⊕G T ∅(m), and hence certainly S ⊕G T G(n), giving
a contradiction.
4. A non-joining theorem for randoms
We now ask whether the set G of the Shore-Slaman theorem, Theorem 1.2, can be
chosen to be n-random. Randomness and genericity are each a notion of typicality,
so a negative answer would suitably complement Corollary 3.8. In this section, we
show that the answer is indeed negative.
Although randomness and genericity are orthogonal notions in most respects, it
is possible to think of randomness as a notion of genericity in a limited way. Namely,
by a result of Kautz, the weakly n-random sets can be characterized in terms of
genericity for Solovay forcing with Π0n classes of positive measure (see [3, Section
7.2.5]). While it may at first seem possible to obtain the result for n-randomness
as just another application of Theorem 3.7, it is worth pointing out that this is
not the case. The reason is that forcing with Π0n classes of positive measure is
only 1-decidable in ∅(n+2), which means that Theorem 3.7 requires a higher level
of genericity than is used in Kautz’s characterization. This level of genericity no
longer corresponds to n-randomness.
Our goal, then, is to give a direct argument for the following result, which is
analogous to Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 4.1. For any non-computable set A ≤T ∅′, there exists a ∅′-computable
perfect tree T ⊆ 2<ω such that for all S ∈ [T ] and all R ⊆ ω, if R is 2-random then
S ⊕R  A.
The following corollary is then obtained exactly as Corollary 2.2 was above.
Corollary 4.2. For all n ≥ 2, there exists an S T ∅(n−1) such that for all G ⊆ ω,
if G is 2-random then S ⊕G T ∅′. In particular, S ⊕G T G(n).
To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma. Fix a Turing reduction Φ,
and define m(τ, ρ) = µ({X : Φ(τ ⊕X)[2 · |τ |]  ρ}) for all τ, ρ ∈ 2<ω, where µ is
the uniform measure on Cantor space.
Lemma 4.3. Let A ⊆ ω be non-computable. For all rational q > 0 and all σ ∈ 2<ω,
there is an n ∈ ω such that the set of τ with m(τ, A ↾ n) ≥ q is not dense above σ.
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Proof. Assume not, and let q and σ witness this fact. Let G ⊆ ω be any set which
is 1-generic relative to A and extends σ. Then G meets {τ  σ : m(τ, A ↾ n) ≥ q}
for all n, and hence if we let En = {X ⊆ ω : Φ(G⊕X)  A↾n}, then µ(En) ≥ q for
all n. Let E =
⋂
nEn. It follows that µ(E) ≥ q, and Φ(G⊕X) = A for all X ∈ E.
By a theorem of Sacks [5], this implies that G ≥T A, which is impossible since
anything 1-generic relative to a non-computable set cannot compute that set. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Because the 2-random sets are closed under the addition of
prefixes, we need only consider a single functional Φ such that Φ(X ⊕ 0e1Y ) =
Φe(X ⊕ Y ) for all sets X and Y and all e ∈ ω. Assume the function m from above
is defined with respect to this Φ.
Computably in ∅′, we construct the tree T by stages, along with a sequence
〈ni : i ∈ ω〉 of numbers. Our test will be defined by
Ui = {τ ∈ 2
<ω : (∃σ ∈ T )[Φ(σ ⊕ τ)  A ↾ ni]}.
Clearly, then, {Ui}i∈ω will be a ∅′-computable sequence of open sets, and if S ∈ [T ]
and R ⊆ ω is such that Φ(S ⊕ R) = A, then some initial segment of R will belong
to every Ui. Thus, to verify the construction below, it will suffice to ensure that
µ(Ui) ≤ 2−i for all i.
Construction. Let Ts denote the approximation to T at stage s, with T0 = {λ}. At
stage s, we define Ts+1 and ns ∈ ω. Let 〈σi : i < m〉 be a listing of the maximal
strings in Ts. We need to add a split above each of these strings, but before can do
so, we will make a series of extensions to each σi.
First, we initialize level s of our test. To do this we find ns ∈ ω, and for all i, a
string σ∗i extending σi such that m(σ,A ↾ns) ≤ 2
−2(s+1) for all σ  σ∗i . Lemma 4.3
establishes that there exists an ns and sequence 〈σ∗i : i < m〉 meeting this condition,
and an instance can be found using ∅′.
Now for any path extending σ∗i we have bounded the size of the strings that will
be enumerated into Us due to this path. However, there will be continuum many
paths above σ∗i in T so we need to do better than this. For all t ≤ s, we extend each
σ∗i in order to force a large number of elements into Ut. We determine a sequence
of extensions
σ∗i  σi,0  . . .  σi,s
inductively as follows. Suppose we have defined σi,t−1 for some t ≤ s, where for
convenience we write σi,−1 = σ
∗
i . Then we find σi,t  σi,t−1 such that
(1) sup
σσi,t−1
m(σ,A ↾ nt)−m(σi,t, A ↾ nt) ≤ 2
−2(s+2).
We define Ts+1 to be downward closure of {σi,sb : i < m ∧ b ∈ {0, 1}}.
Verification. For each i and s, define
Ui,s = {τ ∈ 2
<ω : (∃σ ∈ Ti+s+1)[Φ(σ ⊕ τ)  A ↾ ni]}.
As T =
⋃
s Ts, and Ts ⊆ Ts+1, we have Ui =
⋃
s Ui,s. Note that for all s, the
measure of Ui,s is equal to the sum over the maximal σ ∈ Ts+1 of m(σ,A ↾ ni).
We prove by induction on j ∈ ω that µ(Ui,j) ≤
∑
k≤j 2
−(i+k+1), and hence that
µ(Ui) ≤ 2−i, as desired.
For the base case j = 0, the claim holds because there are 2i+1 many maximal
strings in Ti+1, and for any such string σ we have m(σ, ∅′ ↾ni) < 2−2(i+1) by choice
of ni. Assume, then, that j > 0 and that the claim holds for j − 1. Let σ be a
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maximal string in Ti+j+1, and let τ  σ be a maximal string in Ti+j . By (1), we
have that m(τ, A ↾ ni) is within 2
−2(i+j+1) of supρτ m(ρ,A ↾ ni). Thus, the total
new contribution of m(σ,A ↾ ni) to the measure of Ui,j can be at most 2
−2(i+j+1).
Since there are 2i+j+1 many maximal strings in Ti+j+1, the claim follows. 
For the readers familiar with the basic concepts of algorithmic randomness, we
remark that if T is the tree constructed in Theorem 4.1, then it is easy to see that
∅′ can construct a set S ∈ [T ] such that S is not K-trivial. This gives an example
of a set that is not K-trivial and cannot be joined above ∅′ with a 2-random set.
This contrasts with a recent result of Day and Miller [2] who show that any set S
that is not K-trivial can be joined above ∅′ with an incomplete 1-random set, and
indeed even with a weakly 2-random set.
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